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1.  Introduction 
 
Since 1947, the Vietnam Social Security has provided social insurance to public 
servants and armed forces personnel in Vietnam. In 1995, the Government merged the 
social insurance unit of the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs with that of 
the Vietnam General Confederation of Labor. At the same time the system became 
mandatory to the employees of the newly developing private sector. The consolidated 
system is publicly managed by the Vietnamese Social Security administration (VSS). 
VSS collects contributions and pay social insurance benefits (in case of sickness and sick 
leaves, maternity and family planning related leaves, work injury and professional 
disease, survivorship and to people that reached pension ages). 
 
The mandatory coverage
2 of the private sector was first restricted to the enterprises 
with 10 or more employees. Since 2005, all the types of enterprises, whatever their size, 
have the obligation to register, to VSS, all their employees with a labor contract of 3 
months or longer. In 2006, finally, the Social Insurance Law expanded the coverage of 




These policies are in line with the willingness  of the government to implement 
universal social protection policies in Vietnam. Today coverage is very low. In 2006 only 
16.2% of the employed (approximately 6.6 in a total of about 41.894 million
4
                                                 
1 Comments and questions are welcomed at paulettecastel@gmail.com 
) were 
registered to the Vietnam Social Security. Will these policies lead to significant increases 
of  coverage?  This paper investigates this issue by reviewing the characteristics of 
employment in Vietnam. It concludes that the risk that social coverage remains limited 
2 Since 200x, the poor are mandatory registered to health insurance and fully subsidized. 
3 Voluntary participation to health insurance started in 2005.  
4 VSS report 6.6 contributors in 2006 while according to the VHLSS 2006 the number of employed was 
















































































































dfor many years is high and,  presents  accordingly  some policy options to augment 
Vietnam Social Security’s chances to reach universal coverage in the future. The analysis 
is based on the data on employment, income and participation to social security obtained 
from the 2006 VHLSS.  
   
2.  Working age population under pension age  
 
This section presents a classification of the working age population under standard 
pension age according to its status in relation to social security coverage in Vietnam. The 
working age population includes all the men and women 15 years and above and still 
under the standard retirement age of 55 for the women and 60 for the men
5. The 





The social security system in Vietnam has two components: a mandatory system and 
a voluntary system. The mandatory system covers only the wage employed with labor 
contracts of 3 months and above. The voluntary system, recently created with the Social 
Security Law of 2006, covers all the other workers. The mandatory system includes a 
large range of programs (short-term benefits, compensation for work accident and 
professional disease, old-age pension and survivorship). The voluntary system consists 
only of a pension system with survivorship benefits. Both systems require a minimum 
contribution calculated on the minimum wage. The classification presented in Table 1 
considers, consequently, whether a worker’s individual income is higher or not than the 
minimum wage in the year (over 12 months). 
 
According to these criteria, the working population is divided into 8 groups:   
 
1.  The covered
2. 
: this group includes the employees that are registered to the 
mandatory pension system. It excludes the pensioners who eventually are 
employed but do not necessarily contribute to VSS. This group is usually 
associated to the formal sector. Box 1 explains the methodology used to infer the 
members of that group in the VHLSS 2006. 
The avoiders and the temporaries
3. 
: this group includes the employees who share 
the same characteristics that the covered (are employed in enterprises and earn 
wages higher than the minimum wage) but who are not registered to VSS. It, 
possibly, includes a large group of employees under short-term contracts that 
enterprises are not obliged to register.  
The household units’ employees
                                                 
5 The labor code foresees that some women and some men keep contributing until the age of 60 and 65, 
respectively, and claim pension at that ages. There is, currently, no evidence that some workers used this 
opportunity in Vietnam. The study limits, accordingly, the working population to the standard retirement 
age included in the Social Security Law. 
: this group includes employees who also report 
wage earnings higher than the minimum wage but who work in households units. 
Most household units do not use formal legal labor contracts. Some are officially 
registered but they are not subject to the same stringent regulations than the 
6 In the main job enterprises functioning under the business law. Their employees are consequently 
not registered to social security but they are less likely ‘avoiders’ or 
“temporaries”.  
4.  The self-employed and the farmers
5.   
: this group includes all the workers that could 
participate to the voluntary pension system since they earn an individual income 
higher or equal to the minimum wage (see Box 2). The group includes some low 
wage earners that could not participate on the basis of their wage in the mandatory 
system. The group is divided into 3 sub-groups: the self-employed that do not 
report any individual income from agriculture activities, the farmers that do not 
report any individual income from non-agriculture activity, and the remaining 
workers which individual income comes from agriculture and non-agriculture 
activities.  
The low income earners
6. 
: this group includes the workers that report individual 
earnings (wage and non wage combined) less than the minimum wage. Unless 
these workers are willing to contribute more than 16% of their income, they 
cannot afford to participate to the pension system. 
The pensioners
7. 
: this group includes the persons that report being beneficiaries of 
the mandatory pension system whether they are employed or not. This group is 
distinguished from last group of the inactive and unemployed because it is certain 
that these persons are already covered by the social security system. 
The unemployed and inactive
 
: this group includes the persons that report that they 
do not work either because they could not find a job or for other reasons. The 
group  probably  includes  temporary unemployed from the formal sector. This 
possibility seems, however, very little because unemployment rate is rather low in 
Vietnam.  
Table 1: Working age population under pension age and social security  
  Persons  Share in total  
Wage workers with at least one wage above the minimum wage (possibly 
with other labor non wage income) 
Registered   6 769 062  12.9 
Avoiders and temporaries  2 984 041     5.7 
Household unit’s employees  7 707 555  14.7 
Non wage workers with individual income above the minimum wage 
(possibly with wage incomes but each lower than the minimum wage)  
Farmers and self-employed  19 356 539  36.9 
    Not in agriculture, aquaculture and forestry   5 028 279  9.6 
    Only in agriculture, aquaculture and forestry   9 924 339  18.9 
    In both sectors   4 403 921  8.4 
Low income earners  5 076 316  9.7 
Others 
Pensioners  461 269  0.9 
Inactive and unemployed   10 126 301  19.3 
Total  52 481 082  100.0 
       Source:  VHLSS 2006 and authors’ calculations, details are in Annex 1 
 According to the results in Table 1, about 79.8% of the working age population under 
pension age could participate to social security, either in the mandatory scheme or the 
voluntary pension scheme. If besides the pensioners and the inactive and the unemployed, 
the participation of the low income earners is considered unlikely, the maximum 
plausible achievable participation rate is 70.1%.   
 
The figures on poverty in Table 2 effectively indicate that the poverty rate is the 
highest among the low income earners. It is also relatively high among the farmers 
(workers only employed in the sectors of agriculture, aquaculture and forestry), and the 
household unit’s employees. If the participation of the poor is also considered unlikely, 
then the maximum participation rate is reduced by another 8.3 p.p. to 61.8%. 
 
This approximation of the participation rate is different from the coverage rate of the 
social security systems that is  usually  calculated  only  on  the active population
7
 
  (the 
employed and the unemployed). In that respect, the large access of the voluntary system 
to all the type of workers could create the possibility to achieve rather high coverage rates 
in Vietnam.  
Currently, the participation and the coverage rates are rather low. According to the 
figures in Table 1  only  12.9% of the working age population under pension age 
participates to social security. Based on Vietnam Social Security contributors and 
VHLSS figures on employment, only 16.2% of the employed (6.6 in a total of 41.894 
million) is covered.  
 
Table 2: Poverty rates of the working age population under pension age  
classified according to social security coverage  
  Not poor  Poor






Registered   6 263 523  505 539  6 769 062  7.5  7.3 
Avoiders and temporaries  2 701 278  282 763  2 984 041  9.5  4.1 
Household unit’s employees  6 368 701  1 338 854  7 707 555  17.4  19.3 
Farmers and self-employed  17 115 437  2 254 287  19 369 724  11.6  32.4 
    Not in agriculture, 
aquaculture,  forestry   4 930 453  101 791  5 032 245  2.0  1.5 
    Only in agriculture, 
aquaculture and forestry   8 188 820  1 735 519  9 924 339  17.5  25.0 
    In both sectors   3 996 164  416 977  4 413 141  9.5  6.0 
Low income earners  3 270 306  1 806 010  5 076 316  35.6  26.0 
Pensioners  455 402  5 867  461 269  1.3  0.1 
Unemployed and inactive  9 370 873  755 428  10 126 301  7.5  10.9 
Total  45 545 521  6 948 747  52 494 268  13.2  100.0 
   Source: VHLSS 2006 and authors’ calculations.  Notes: 1/ GSO definition of poverty (see Tuyet and 
Paulette for more precisions), the national poverty rat is 15.8%.  
                                                 
7 With the exception of the countries in which all the residents have the obligation or the possibility to 





Box 1 VHLSS employees registered to the Vietnam Social Security 
 
The VHLSS of 2006 does not include any question about the registration of employees to 
the Vietnam Social Security (VSS). Participation is approximate based on the responses to 
the participation in the mandatory health insurance system.  
 
•  All the employees of working age with wage above the minimum wage and 
mandatory health insurance are assumed to be also registered to VSS (pensioners 
are excluded).  
•  All the employees of working age with above the minimum wage and employed in 
a FDI enterprise are assumed to be also registered to VSS, even if they do not 
report being in the mandatory health insurance.  This assumption is consistent with 
the finding of Thanh and Paulette (2009) that about 80% of the FDI enterprises are 
registered to VSS.  In case of multi-employment the place with the highest wage is 
determinant.  
 
As the figures in Table 3 show, the results are close to the figures published by VSS.  
 
                      Table 3: Registered employees VSS and VHLSS 2006   
  VSS  VHLSS estimate 
registered employees 
1. Public sector 
1/  3 724 832  4 018 928 
2. FDI sector  1 189 326  940 120 
3. Private sector  1 578 482  1 810 014 
4. Others  58 136   
Total  6 550 776  6 769 062 
                     Note: 1/ Employees reporting in health insurance for public employment  
 
 
The number of employees of the public sector is larger. The figures in the Labor Force 
Surveys of MOLISA and GSO of 2007 report even higher number of employees in the 
public sector: 4.215 and 4.977 million respectively.  These discrepancies maybe arise 
from the difficulty of survey’s respondents and/or VSS to determine the ownership of the 
enterprises in process of equitisation (transformation into a public limited company or a 
corporation).  
 
The number of FDI employees is smaller. The figures in the Labor Force Surveys of 
MOLISA and GSO of 2007 report also smaller numbers: 0.836 and 0.920 million 
respectively. This could also be connected to the confusion of ownership related to the 
process of equitisation.  3.  Participation of the employees to the mandatory scheme  
 
The first three groups in Table 1 include employees with wages above the minimum 
wage that could participate to the mandatory scheme unless they are hired under short-
term contracts (less than 3 months) or without labor contract at all. Because the large 
number of the household units in Vietnam, only few workers must be registered to the 
Vietnam social security. Based on the VHLSS, there were in 2006 17.461 million wage 




Among the wage employees not registered to the Vietnam Social Security, 44.1% are 
employed in household units, most likely without labor contract and, 17.1% are 
employed in the enterprise sector. If according to the findings of Thanh and Paulette 
(2009) about 1 110 823 of these employees are employed under short-term contracts, the 
share of the employees working in enterprises that do not comply with the law is rather 
law: 10.7% (see Table 3). In such cases, the low coverage of the wage employed is not an 
issue of legal enforcement. 
                                   Table 3: Social Security Status of wages workers
1/  
  Number  Share 
Registered  6 769 062  38.8 
Avoiders and temporaries  2 984 041  17.1 
     Short-term employees
2/  1 110 823  6.4 
     Others  1 873 318  10.7 
Household units  7 707 555  44.1 
Total  17 460 658  100.0 
Notes: 1/ Employees are potential participants to the mandatory scheme if 
one of the wages they earn is above to the minimum wage. Employees for 
which only the sum of the wages they earn is above the minimum wage 
are excluded from this group. 2/ Thanh and Paulette (2009) 
  
Table 4 observes that the employees of the group of the “avoiders and temporaries” 
have effectively  a working profile of temporary workers. They have lower years of 
experience in the enterprise  they work than the other workers:  one quarter of these 
employees have one year or less of experience.  
Table 4: Wage workers’ Social Security status and year of experience in enterprise 
  1 year or less  2 years or less 
than 3 years 
3 years or more   Total 
Registered  10.4  12.2  77.4  100.0 
Avoiders and 




units  10.3  14.9  74.8 
100.0 
Total  12.9  14.4  72.7  100.0 
                                                 
8 The LFS of MOLISA and GSO report smaller numbers of wage workers: 10.290 and 13.860 million 
respectively although they include also the wage employed above retirement age.    If the VHLSS, 
effectively, overestimates the number of wage employees, the mandatory system covers a higher share of 
the wage employed.  
 Table 5 observes how many wage employees are likely to be working as employees 
in their own household units and by so, have a special employer employee relationship 
that could not require the same type of social insurance that the proposed under the 
mandatory system. Depending on the group, between 28 and 35% of the wage employees 
are effectively living in households that report some income from non wage employment 
in other sectors than agriculture, aquaculture and forestry. The number of persons 
employed as wage worker in their own household unit is, however, very low: 2%. Such a 
type of employer employee relationship cannot explain, therefore, the lack of registration 
of the wage workers in the household units.  
 
        Table 5: Wage workers’ employment in household units  
  Total 
In household with 





    Number 
Share in 
category  Number 
Share in 
category 
Registered  6769062  2095178  31%  108884  2% 
Avoiders and temporaries  2984041  1049088  35%  68670  2% 
Household units  7707555  2196030  28%  88426  1% 
Total  17460658  5340296  31%  265980  2% 
 
More generally, only 5.2% of the workers that live in households that report some 
income from non wage employment in other sectors than agriculture, aquaculture and 
forestry, possibly employ members of the household  (as wage employed, Table 6). 
.   
Table 6: Number of workers living in households with non farm income  
Employ members of 
households 
Number of people reporting 
income from non self-
employment (non farm) 
Share 
Yes  637 748  5.2 
No  11 611 403  94.8 
Total  12 249 151  100.0 
 
 
4.  Participation of the non wage workers to the voluntary scheme 
 
The Social Security Law of 2006 foresees the creation of a voluntary pension system. 
Its implementation started in 2008, there is still very little information about the process. 
This section, consequently, only assesses the potential participation of the non-wage 
workers.  
 
4.1 the regulations and the total number of the potential participants   
The design of the voluntary pension system is almost similar to the design of the 
mandatory pension system, except that there is no guaranteed minimum pension:  •  Participants must on average (different periodicities are allowed) contribute at 
least 16% of the minimum wage per year. After 2010, this rate will be increased 
by 2% every 2 years until it reaches 22% 
•  When reaching pension age, workers with less than 20 years of contributions are 
entitled to one lump sum amount; those with 20 years and more are entitled to a 
monthly pension and, eventually a lump sum.  
•  The amount of the monthly benefit and the lump sum are calculated with the 
same formula than in the mandatory scheme, but there is no minimum pension.  
Table 7 presents estimates of the total number of the potential participants. The group 
includes the 19.357 million self-employed and farmers classified in Table 1. It could also 
include the wage workers who are not registered to the Vietnam Social Security and are 
involved in non wage activities. In that case the total number of potential participants is 
20.600 million.  
 
Table 7 Potential participants to the voluntary system
1/  
 
Excluding not registered  
employees with wages and 
other income below the 
minimum wage 
Including only not 
registered employees 
with wages and other 
income above the 
minimum wage income 
  Number  Share  Number  Share 
Not in agriculture, aquaculture and 
forestry   5 028 279  26.0  5 097 680  24.7 
Only in agriculture, aquaculture and 
forestry   9 924 339  51.3  10 767 979  52.3 
In both sectors   4 403 921  22.8  4 740 454  23.0 
Total Self-employed and farmers  19 356 539  100.0  20 606 113  100.0 
Note: 1/ include workers with non wage labor activities and total labor income (eventually wages 
included) is above the minimum wage 
4.2 Affordability  
Achieving high coverage of the self-employed and the farmers could be rather 
difficult. Because rural incomes are relatively low, it could be that only few farmers can 
afford participate. As the figures in Table 8 indicate, there were about 5.1 million of low 
income earners in 2006. They represent 26% of the working-age population. The poverty 
rate among low income earners is particularly high (35.6% of them), some are, however, 
not poor. For personal reasons they work part-time or on temporary basis (students, etc.).  
Among the workers that earn income equal or above the minimum wage, farmers and 
the wage employed in small business units register the same probability of being poor 
(17.5% and 17.4%, respectively). It is interesting to observe that contrary to some 
common belief about the workers of the formal sector are poor: 7.5% of the registered 
employees, who earn income equal or above the minimum are poor.  For all these people 
affordability is an important issue for participating into a pension scheme.  
 Table 8 Poverty rates of the working age population under pension age  
classified according to social security coverage 
  Not poor  Poor






Registered   6 263 523  505 539  6 769 062  7.5  7.3 
Avoiders and temporaries  2 701 278  282 763  2 984 041  9.5  4.1 
Household unit’s 
employees  6 368 701  1 338 854  7 707 555  17.4  19.3 
Farmers and self-employed  17 115 437  2 254 287  19 369 724  11.6  32.4 
    Not in agriculture, 
aquaculture,  forestry   4 930 453  101 791  5 032 245  2.0  1.5 
    Only in agriculture, 
aquaculture and forestry   8 188 820  1 735 519  9 924 339  17.5  25.0 
    In both sectors   3 996 164  416 977  4 413 141  9.5  6.0 
Low income earners  3 270 306  1 806 010  5 076 316  35.6  26.0 
Pensioners  455 402  5 867  461 269  1.3  0.1 
Unemployed and inactive  9 370 873  755 428  10 126 301  7.5  10.9 
Total  45 545 521  6 948 747  52 494 268  13.2  100.0 
   Source: VHLSS 2006. Notes: 1/ GSO definition of poverty, the national poverty rate in 2006 was 
15.8%.  
4.3 Expected benefits  
The willingness to participate is also sensitive to the expected level of pension benefits 
workers can expect at retirement. One important feature of the voluntary pension system 
(and the mandatory as well) is that receiving a monthly pension at retirement requires a 
contribution period of at least 20 years. Workers who have contributed less than 20 years 
are entitled to a lumps sum.  
4.3.1. Previous study  
Several  studies  show that if about half of the informal workers are interested  in 
participation in a pension system, very few are willing to do so if they are entitled to a 
lump sum instead of a pension at retirement.  
 
The study Sarah Bahles and Paulette Castel (2005) organized with the support of 
ILSSA presents a measure of the willingness of the workers of the informal sector to 
participate in pension scheme
9
                                                 
9 The study also evaluates the risk and the income shock associated with severe disability and the lost of the 
breadwinner and the willingness to participate in a disability and survivorship social insurance scheme. 
. For that purpose a survey was designed in which 
respondents were asked about their readiness to participate in an actuarially fair pension 
system. In such a system, participants are entitled to receive a pension (in this case equal 
to half of the minimum wage) if,  by the time they reach retirement age, the total amount 
of contributions they paid plus the interests these contributions have accumulated during 
the contributory period reach a certain minimum level. Under such a scheme, persons 
who start contributing at older age have to pay higher amounts of monthly contribution to be able to achieve the required accumulation of contributions plus interest for pension at 
the time they reach retirement age. This principle is also observed in the case of life 
insurance. Therefore, for a same level of income, it is financially harder for middle age 
workers to participate in such a scheme.  
 
About 34.5% of the respondents declared that they would be willing to participate in 
such a scheme; 16.5 percentage points more would be interested if part of their 
contributions would be subsidized and, 49 % were not interested at all. Table 9 shows the 
reasons people indicated for not willing to participate.  
 
Table 9: Reasons for non-participation in a pension scheme 








Premiums too high  14.2  8.9  13.7  15.3  18.5 
No money to contribute  42.1  40.1  38.8  46.4  41.6 
Don't really understand  3.4  3.9  3.6  3.0  3.4 
Wary of complicated 
paperwork  
3.3  3.5  3.1  2.3  5.4 
Low benefits  11.3  7.0  14.9  10.4  10.2 
Have other source of 
support 
3.7  4.6  3.4  3.1  5.0 
Retirement age too high  9.2  11.0  8.9  9.5  7.2 
Not interested  10.5  20.1  11.5  7.1  5.6 
Other  2.4  1.0  2.1  3.0  2.9 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Based on 1632 observations  Source: VSIIS 
 
With the results of the VSIIS, a second study (Castel P. 2008) estimated the potential 
coverage rate that the voluntary pension system could achieve in Vietnam. The study first 
estimated the relationship between the willingness to participate and the characteristics of 
the respondents and of the pension system. The relationship was then used to predict the 
potential coverage of the voluntary pension system in Vietnam after replacing in the 
initial equation the value of the contribution rates and the replacement rates of the VSIIS 
actuarially fair scheme by the levels taken by these variables in the voluntary pension 
system.  
 
Graph 3 and Graph 4 compares by age group the levels of the contribution and 
replacement rates in the VSIIS and the voluntary pension systems. In this study, the 
contribution rate was  equal to the minimum amount of contribution divided by the 
respondents’ household income per capita. The replacement rate was equal to the level of 
the pension benefits divided by the respondents’ household income per capita. 
 
As it was explained above, the contribution rates in the VSIIS increase exponentially 
with age, because the system is actuarially fair. By contrast the contribution rates in the 
voluntary pension system are rather flat. The reason is that all the participants have to 
contribute the same minimum amount in VND and the range of households’ income per 
capita in the informal sector is rather narrow.  
 Graph 3
Contribution rates 




















































































VSIIS pension scheme Voluntary pension system
 
 
Opposite trends are observed on replacement rates. In the VSIIS, replacement rates 
are rather flat because the level of the pension benefit is the same for all the participants, 
and the range of households’ income per age group is narrow. Replacement rates in the 
voluntary fund decrease with age, because pension entitlements diminish when the length 
of contribution shortens.  Replacement rates calculated on retirees’ lump sums (after they 
are transformed into monthly annuities) are particularly low, especially for the workers 























































































VSIIS pension scheme Voluntary pension system
 
 The results of the simulation show (see Table 10) that high coverage could be 
achieved among the young population. The expected participation of middle age workers 
(40 years and above) is rather low. Although participation is much more affordable than 
in the VSIIS pension scheme, the very low level of the expected benefits reduces 
significantly the willingness to participate.  
 
Table 10: Predicted potential participation in the voluntary pension system 
Age group  Participation rate 
15 to 19 yrs  60.6 
20 to 24 yrs  87.7 
25 to 29 yrs  86.3 
30 to 34 yrs  83.9 
35 to 39 yrs  72.2 
40 to 44 yrs  41.5 
45 to 49 yrs  8.1 
50 to 54 yrs  0.4 
55 to 60 yrs  0.2 
Total  48.8 
 
A third study (ILSSA, Castel P. 2007) on the members of the Nghe An Pension Fund 
for farmers about their willingness to move to the voluntary pension scheme confirms the 
low interest of the population to participate in the case there is no chance to obtain a 
pension. Because of their age or the low level of the savings they had accumulated in the 
Nghe An Pension Fund, many participants of this fund could not expect to be entitled to a 
pension if they transfer their savings and contribute into the voluntary pension system 
until retirement. The study calculated the amount of savings these persons should pay in 
order to be entitled to receive a pension instead of a lump sum if they were allowed to 
“buy the missing contributory years”. Respondents were asked about their preferences. 
The results are shown in Table 11.  
 
The category of the participants that were proposed to realize additional contributions 
are the second and the third category. A rather large number of these persons would be 
interested in participating in the voluntary pension scheme if they can realize additional 
payments and receive a pension at retirement. Among those who refuse to realize 
additional payments and can choose to contribute to receive a lump sum instead, only 2 
percentage points are interested in receiving a lump sum.  
 
In summary, these studies show that if about half of the population of the informal 
workers could be interested in participating in a pension system. Very few of the middle 









Table 11: Participation rates to VN scheme by members’ group of the Nghe An 
Pension Fund for farmers 
    Contribution per month     
  Accept  Option 1 
4/  Option 2 
5/ 
Option 3 
6/     
 
 











Refuse   Total 
Entitled to pension 
1/  78.2  58.3  19.9  …  21.8  100.0 
Additional payments 
2/  61.3  39.1  20.3  2.0  38.7  100.0 




55.7  41.6  15.1  …  43.4 
100.0 
Note 4815 respondents Notes: 1/ people young or with enough savings in the Nghe An Pension Fund to be 
obtain a pension if they continue to contribute in the voluntary pension scheme until retirement age 2/ 
people not young enough or with insufficient savings to obtain a pension. These persons would be entitled 
to a lump sum if they continue to contribute in the voluntary pension scheme until retirement age. The 
study asked these persons about their willingness to pay a certain amount of additional contributions 
(calculated on their savings) to obtain a pension instead. 3/ These persons are less than 5 years from 
retirement age they could not participate in the voluntary pension scheme. Like in the case of 2/, the study 
asked these persons about their willingness to pay a certain amount of additional contributions (calculated 
on their savings) to obtain a pension instead. 4/ Contribute 72 th. VND per month and if needed pay 
additional contributions to obtain a pension 5/ Contribute 50 th. VND per month and if needed pay 
additional contributions to obtain a pension 6/ Contribute 50 th VND per month and obtain a lump sum at 
retirement.  
 
4.3.2. Age structure of workers in the informal sector  
Many current workers of the informal sector, today, are less than 20 years from 
standard retirement age. These workers are less likely to participate even if they  are 
probably the persons that are the most ready to save towards old-age income. The results 
in Table 12 indicate that, if the access to the voluntary pension system had been possible 
in 2006, about 36.4 of the self-employed and farmers could not have been able to 
contribute for 20 years before reaching pension age.  
 
Table 12: self-employed and farmers by young and middle aged 
Self employed and farmers 
 (including not register wage workers) 
Women below 40, 
men below 45 years 
Women above 40, 
men above 45 years 
Not in agriculture, aquaculture and forestry   62.0  38.0 
Only in agriculture, aquaculture and forestry   64.4  35.6 
In both sectors   63.4  36.6 
Total   63.6  36.4 
 
In such a context, Vietnam could also start a vicious circle regarding the participation 
to the voluntary pension scheme. Problems of affordability combined with institutional 
design that reduce potential participants’ access to monthly benefit at retirement could result, in the coming years, to low participation. Because of the low coverage, young 
workers of the informal sector will continue to be little aware of the voluntary system. 
And by the time they will plan to save for old-age income, it will be too late for them to 
contribute so that they obtain a pension. Consequently, besides the poor, many elderly 
will continue to be uncovered. Public perception that the voluntary pension system is not 
efficient will slowly increase and this in turn will turn away new potential participants.   
 
5.  Policy implications and options 
 
All these elements raise concerns about the ability of the new social insurance law to 
significantly lead to high coverage in the future.  
 
Social security coverage rates are often low in developing countries. The graph below 
from Rofman R. (2005) shows, for example, that Latin American countries manage to 
reach coverage rates lower than 60% of the active population. 
  
 
More than government’s capacity to enforce the law, low coverage rates are 
associated to the large share in employment of jobs with no social security benefits 
attached to (Jackle and Li, 2006). Long minimum contributory period explain the rather 
low number of workers eligible for old-age pension receipts in Uruguay, Brazil and Chile 
(Bucheli M. and all, 2005; Kritzer B., 2008; Schwarzer H. 2002 Bustamante J, 2006). In 
these countries however, the phenomenon is associated to the turnover of workers 
between jobs with and without mandatory participation. Finally, several studies suggest 
that the minimum contribution reduce the participation of the low income earners 
(Bucheli M. and all, 2007, Auerbach P. 2007, Kritzer, 2008). Other studies suggest that 
besides the characteristics of the labor market and the institutional design of the system, 
low rates of participation can also be related to the weak preferences for participating in 
social insurance programs of many workers (Barr A. and Packard T. 2002). The analysis of Thanh and Paulette (2009) suggests that this cause is also not negligible in Vietnam, 
and could worsen in the coming years.  
 
In such a context, solutions that only focus on one dimension of the problem might be 
ineffective. If wage workers are not willing to contribute, integrating the wage workers 
employed in the household units to the social security system does not only require 
impose more stringent legal directives on these places. The policy packages must 
therefore prioritize the reforms that lower workers’ resistance to participate. Measures 
that strengthen the legal framework of the labor market and support law enforcement will 
be effective only if workers are themselves motivated to participate.  
 
One of the most important disincentives to participate is the lack of possible entitlement 
for pension if the person cannot contribute for 20 years.   
 
Policy 1: Increase likelihood to obtain old-age pension 
 
The minimum length of contribution to obtain a pension turns off the willingness to 
participate of middle age workers. The rationales behind such a regulation suggest that its 
elimination might, however, not be the best policy option in Vietnam.  
 
Many pension systems include a rather long minimum contributory period to avoid 
large financial imbalances between participant’s present values of contributions and 
pension  incomes. At retirement, in an actuarial fair pension system in which the 
contributions return interests, the present value of a retiree’s sum of pension benefits 
must be equal to the total contributions plus interest the retiree has accumulated. In such a 
system, pensions increase wit the length of the contributory period but the relation is not 
linear (not proportional). There are two types of consequences that lead to impose 
minimum length of contribution. First, pension formulas are usually rough linear 
approximation of the relation between pension income and years of contribution. When 
applied to short contributory periods they provide low pensions in absolute terms, but still 
excessively high in relation to the amount of contributions paid. Second, the delivery of 
very low pension benefits (although actuarially fair) to retirees is socially unsustainable, 
particularly if the recipients are low income earners.  
 
As it was mentioned above the minimum length of contribution has a negative impact 
on coverage because a large share of the contributors in developing countries participates 
for relatively short periods. Several governments in Latin America, accordingly, are 
currently considering the reduction or the elimination of the minimum length of 
contribution. Colombia and Uruguay are considering reforms that would reduce the 
vesting period (Bucheli and al. 2007). In the case of Chile, the 2008 reform eliminates the 
condition that workers have 20 years of contribution to access the guaranteed minimum 
pension. Unless participation is mandatory for all the categories of workers like in Chile 
(see Box 3), these options, however, do not solve the financial issues exposed above.  
 
Because the participation of the self-employed is voluntary in Vietnam, eliminating 







  the minimum length of contribution is maintained, but contributors are 
allowed to “buy years” and, by so, are able to complete the minimum contributory 
length 
This option introduces flexibility about the way people contribute to the system and 
manage to accumulate enough “contributions” when they reach pension age.  In an 
actuarially fair pension system (like the one designed in the VSIIS), only workers who 
managed at retirement age to accumulate a minimum amount of contributions plus 
interests are entitled to a minimum pension. In an actuarial setting, the timing of the 
contributions does not matter as long as the minimum amount of contributions plus 
interest is achieved at retirement.  In the case of the pension system in Vietnam, 20 years 
of minimum contributions are required to obtain a pension. Workers with less than this 
amount of “savings” would be authorized to realize additional contributions  before 
reaching retirement. In such a framework, the minimum value of one contributory year 
Box 3: Pension system coverage, the case of Chile
* 
 
Since the reform of 1981 pension incomes in Chile are obtained from fully funded individual 
accounts and government’s recognition bond related to the pension rights contributors had 
accumulated in the previous pay-as-you-go system. Initially, the system had two types of 
minimum guaranteed benefits: (1) the guaranteed minimum pension under the capitalization 
system if the contributor had 20 years of contribution and, (2) means-tested benefits to low 
income earners disabled or over 65 years old who were not eligible for any other type of 
pension.  
 
The first evaluation of the impact of the new reform found that a large share of the workers, 
who are reaching pension age now or in the next decades, won’t receive any pension income 
because they do not comply with the requirement of 20 years of contributions and do not 
qualify for the means-tested benefit.  
 
To expand coverage, the reform of 2008 has created a new mandatory “solidarity scheme”.  
The new system provides a basic pension that replaces the current government’s guaranteed 
pension. The requirement of 20 years of contribution is eliminated and replaced with a 
minimum requirement of 20 years of residency.  
 
To avoid free-riding behaviors (workers that do not contribute when they can afford it and that 
receive the basic pension anyway) the participation to the “solidarity scheme” is mandatory 
and the participation to the individual accounts is progressively becoming also mandatory to 
the self-employed. The government provides also a monthly subsidy to low-income workers 
(those who earn less than one and a half times the minimum wage per month) between ages 
18 and 35 and their employers for the first 24 months of employment after they first enter the 
labor force. 
 
(*) based on Kritzer B. (2008) could be for example defined as equivalent to the minimum amount of contributions that 
is paid in a year on the minimum wage  (currently, 16% of 12  times the monthly 
minimum wage). Other definitions can be used.  
 
A similar mechanism is mentioned in the decree 41/2009/QĐ-TTg on the transfer of 
the Nghe An Farmer Pension Fund to the National voluntary pension scheme. The decree 
describes how the pension rights of the members of the Nghe An Pension Fund that 
decide to participate in the voluntary pension system are recognized. In the case that the 
voluntary pension system recognizes a number of years of contributions lower than the 
number of years of membership in the Nghe An Pension Fund, the insured can realize 
additional contributions and obtain that all the years are recognized.  
 
Because the pension system in Vietnam is relatively new and economic widespread 
prosperity is relatively recent, many workers will reach pension age in the coming years 
with less than 20 years of minimum contributions and probably not enough savings to 
realize the additional contributions necessary to obtain a pension.  
 
A complementary policy could be that The Vietnam Social Security (or a financial 
institution) provides loans to these workers so they can realize the necessary additional 
contributions before reaching retirement. These loans could be reimbursed partly at the 








First, providing pension income to the workers with relatively small savings will avoid 
important drop in welfare among the future elderly, especially among the workers who 
have worked only in the private sector. Second, the consequent speed up of the progress 
of social security coverage in Vietnam will bring evidences of the advantage of a well 
functioning pension system. This, in turn, will foster younger generation willingness to 
participate. As the paper of Than and Paulette (2009) shows changing the perception and 
attitude of the young generations toward social security is fundamental to increase 
significantly coverage and bring more resources to the system.  
 
Policy 2: Increase coverage of low income earners   
 
Participation is likely to be very low among many poor low income earners or casual 
workers. Contribution levels can be too high and many of these workers cannot focus on 
the long-term. In particular, income instability increases the uncertainty regarding the 
ability to contribute for a long period. In these conditions, poor workers’ expectations to 
obtain an old-age pension at retirement are very little. Their participation, as a result, is 
                                                 
10 In France, certain social aids to elderly or to people with disability are repaid by the heirs (depending on 
the wealth passed to the heirs). See Bodson J. La pratique du droit: l’aide sociale.  
11 These loans could follow the same type of procedures that are currently being implemented by the 
Vietnam Development Bank. In 2009, the bank will provide 0% loans to enterprises that have had to lay off 
100 persons or 30% of their staff (with labor contract) and still face financial difficulties to pay social 
contributions. The maximum duration of the loans is 12 months.  almost null. With very little savings, these workers are, however, vulnerable to poverty 
during old-age. 
 
This section discusses two policy options: the provision of non-contributory pensions 
to low income earners when they reach pension ages and, the provision of subsidies to 





: introduce non-contributory pensions   
Participation and therefore coverage of low income earners are expected to be very 
low. Non-contributory or social pensions aim at filling this gap. In such a framework, 
governments  guarantee a minimum old-age income to the poor elderly who are not 
entitled to pensions. Social pensions are usually granted at ages higher than standard 
retirement age. Brazil and South Africa are famous examples (Barientos M., 2002). The 
means tested pension benefit implemented in Chile until 2008 is another example. In 
Brazil, non-contributory pensions have been implemented since the 70’s to cover poor 
farmers. The scheme at the beginning was limited to household’ heads and, the level of 
the benefit was rather low (half of the minimum wage). In the 90’s coverage was largely 
expanded and the pension increased to one minimum wage. The per capita family income 
of the beneficiaries cannot surpass one quarter of the minimum wage, however 
(Schwarzer H, 2007). In South Africa, most beneficiaries are poor Africans that could not 
participate to the social security system during the apartheid. Entitlements require a 
means test of the income of the beneficiary and spouse (Barientos M., 2002).  
 





: subsidize the participation of the poor and support the access to old-age 
pension under the general scheme 
Instead of securing minimum pension incomes to the poor, the government subsidizes 
the contributions of the poor during their spell of poverty. At retirement, the government 
subsidizes the amount of the pension income that is not generated by the worker’s 
contributions. For example, in the case of Vietnam, if a poor worker has managed to 
contribute only for 10 years (with and without government’s support), the government 
finances the “buying” of the remaining 10 years so that the worker obtain a pension. 
Entitlements to these subsidies are subject to means test income and other screening 
procedures.  
 
This option could require less government’s funding that the previous option. The 
reason is that government’s subsidies to contributions increase the probability that low 
income workers manage to contribute the number of years that give them access to 
pension. Without support, workers’ uncertainty over their financial capacity to contribute 
enough years to obtain an old-age pension strongly limits their willingness to participate. 
The government’s support reduces such a risk. It increases, accordingly, low income earner’s participation and their chances to reach pension age with enough years of 
contribution to obtain a pension. In option 2A, the government funds the totality of the 
pension incomes. In this option the government funds only a portion. The other portion is 
funded by the workers themselves in the periods they manage to receive higher income.  
 
Because the system is voluntary, the policy bears the risk that once they have escape 
poverty workers stop to participate. Near poor workers probably face also a lot of 
economic hardship and uncertainty. In Vietnam, a simulation of the participation of poor 
workers who have  moved from the first (the lowest) to the second income quintile 
indicates that about one third of the workers,  after escaping poverty,  could stop 
participating in the pension system (Castel P. 2008
12
 
). The policy includes, therefore, a 
risk of ‘free riding”: workers accumulate years of contribution when they are poor, stop 
contributing when they are better off, and receive government’s support  to receive a 
minimum pension income when they retire. Mandatory participation would solve this 
free-riding problem, a solution adopted recently by Chile (see box 3).  
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 Annex 1: Classification of the working age population and Vietnam 
Social Security status  
 
Step 0 People are likely to be registered to the social security if they earn a wage above 
the minimum wage  
•  Construction of a variable that = 0 if maximum wage (of the possibly 3 
wages reported) is higher than the minimum wage, =1 otherwise 
•  The average wage is calculated depending on the number of month the 
person report being employed in that job. The average wage is compared 
to the average wage over that period, depending on the date of the 
interview 
Step 2 100% likely registered and very likely reported  
•  100% likely registered: all the people that report having health insurance 
because they are wage employed (and earn above the min wage) in a 
public or private enterprise, 
   but the number of resulting contributors is much lower than VSS 
adm data 
•  Adding the very likely: all the other people that report having health 
insurance and  that are wage employed (and earn above the min wage) 
  the number of resulting contributors is still much lower than VSS 
adm data 
Step 3 Defining sector of employment   
•  The sector of employment is the sector corresponding to the highest wage 
received. There is a case in which the wage is of the same level in the first 
and second job, given that the worker is in FDI in the second job, this 
person is classified as in FDI. If the highest wage is earned in the third job 
the sector is undefined. These workers do not work in FDI in their first or 
second job.  
•  We compare working in public sector, in FDI and in other private to VSS 
figures.  
  The number of public is a little bit higher 
  The number of FDI is much lower  
  The number of private is little bit smaller  
Step 4 Restricting the public sector, expanding FDI  
•  The public sector is restricted to employed in public sector (step 2) and 
obtained health insurance from public sector (step1) 
•  The FDI employees is expanded: by adding all the workers employed in 
FDI (step 2) with wage above the minimum wage even if they do not 
report having health insurance through employment or health insurance at 
all.  
Step 5 Estimation of the “avoiders”  
•  The avoiders are the wage employed with a wage higher than the 
minimum wage who are not classified as registered (step 1 to 4).  
  Some are employed in SoE 
  Others are employed in hh enterprises and small enterprises   
 Step6 Estimation of the farmers and self-employed potentially covered  
•  This group includes the farmers and self-employed with an individual 
income (that eventually includes some wage income) is higher than the 
minimum wage and do not benefit from mandatory health insurance  
o  Only farmers  with or without some wage employment  
o  Only self-employed with or without some wage employment 
o  Farmers and self-employed with or without wage employment  
Step 7 Estimation of the potentially uncovered 
•  This group includes all the workers who don’t benefit from mandatory 
health insurance that have an individual income (eventually includes wage 
income) lower than the minimum wage.  
o  Only wage earners 
o  Only farmers  with or without some wage employment  
o  Only self-employed with or without some wage employment 
o  Farmers and self-employed with or without wage employment  
Step 8 Active pensioners  
•  This group includes the persons that benefit from mandatory health 
insurance because they are retired 
o  Active: they report working  
Step 9  Inactive  
•  This group includes all the persons that report 
o  Some benefit from mandatory health insurance because they 
are retired 
o  The other don’t  
  Householdkeeper, disabled, students,  
  Unemployed  
  Active: they report working  
The people in this group could have or will have the opportunity to participate to the 
voluntary system, or to the mandatory system depending on the type of employment they 
had/will take.  
 
Annex 2: Estimation of individual income  
 
The VHLSS reports individual income figures only on wage earnings. Income from self-
employment business activities or farming are reported and calculated at household level. 
The estimates of the individual income used in this study are based on a distribution of 
each household’s  income (excluding wages) among the working members  of the 
household according to the time each member reports working in a year in that or these 
activities.   
Step 1: reclassification of the type of employment when respondents report being 
involved in some activity but the household does not report any income from such 
activity, or inversely the household report some income but no household members 
declare involved in that type of activity.   
•  We expect that if a respondent indicate that he/she is wage worker, self-
employed or farmer, the household effectively report wage income, non-wage non-agriculture income and/or agriculture income or in case income is null, 
that the households released some expenditures related to the activity 
mentioned.  
We observe: 
•  some households with no wage income have members that declare being wage 
workers (unpaid?)  
•  some households report some agriculture income but do not include any 
farmer  
•  some households with no agriculture income have members that declare being 
farmers  
•  some household with agriculture income do not have any members declaring 
being a farmer 
•   
 
 Reclassification:  
•  The 37 people that declare being wage worker but that do not report any 
wage. Among them16 live in households with no wage income, the rest live in 
households with wage income and other wage earners. All declare being 
involved also in another activity. All these persons are considered as unpaid 
wage workers and are not classified as wage worker in the variable Ewage 
•  One person report having some agriculture activity in an household that do not 
report any activity (spending or income) in agriculture This person reports 
also being self-employed and lives in a household with self-employment 
income. This person is not considered a farmer in the variable Eagr. 
•  There are 21 people that say they are farmers but live in household with no net 
income from agriculture or spending in the agriculture sector.  
o  10 of them do not report other activity.  
  2 of them live in households with no labor income at all. They 
are reclassified as not being farmer and not working.  
  5 persons live in households with non agriculture income. They 
are reclassified as being self-employed  
  3 persons live in households with only wage income. They are 
reclassified as not being farmer and not working.  
o  11 person report other activity, they are reclassified as not being 
farmers 
•  In the case of the households with agriculture income but no farmers 
  all the members of the household that report being employed  are 
reclassified as being also farmers. 
  still 106 persons live in a household with no employed member  
  all the person 15 years and above in these households that  
declare that they do not work but are not sick or disabled are 
reclassified as being farmer.  
  one person is the unique working-age member of the household 
and report not working because of illness. That person is 
reclassified as being farmer.  
 Step 2: estimation of the time spent in each activity. The time reported doing wage work 
is directly reported. The time spent in other activities must be distributed among the 
household’s members that report being involved in these activities. The distribution is 
made in relation to the time spent at work by each member.  
•  Wage employment: the time reported in wage work.  
•  Farmers: the  time reported in activities of the agriculture sector (branches 
between 1 and 5) 
•  Calculation of the remaining time: total reported time minus time spent on 
agriculture and wage works.  
•  Farmers and self-employed are assumed to spend equally their time in the two 
activities   
Specific cases: 
•  Three wages are possibly reported but the time spent on labor activities is only 
reported for the first and the second job, not for the third. When the worker is 
a wage employed, it is assumed that the worker has been working in that job 
as long as in the first or the second job. When no time is indicated for the first 
and the second job the worker is assumed to have worked only for 1 month.      
•  We expect that the remaining time is equal to 0 when workers are only wage 
employed and/or with only farming activities. In 4 cases, the calculation 
obtains some unallocated remaining time. The reason is that these workers are 
wage employed in their 3
rd job. The sector of their first and second job is in 
industry construction or service, so we assume that this time is the time they 
spend on wage employment.   
 
Step 3: distribution of the income in accordance the percentage of household’s time spent 
in the activity in the total of time spent by all households member in the activity. If there 
is no time mentioned, the income is divided by the number of household members 
involved in the activity.  
  